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Preface
This report presents an overview and summary of the methodology for flight readiness
assessment of spaceflight systems developed by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory under NASA
RTOP 553-02-01 sponsored by the Office of Space Flight, NASA Headquarters. This methodol-
ogy was developed as a part of the Certification Process Assessment task carried out for the
Space Shuttle Main Engine. A comprehensive report detailing the methodology, computer
software, and examples of application will be formally issued in fiscal year 1991.
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Abstract
An improved methodology for quantitatively evaluating failure risk for a spaceflight system
in order to assess flight readiness is presented. This methodology is of particular value when
information relevant to failure prediction, including test experience and knowledge of
parameters used in engineering analyses of failure phenomena, is limited. In this approach,
engineering analysis models that characterize specific failure modes based on the physics and
mechanics of the failure phenomena are used in a prescribed probabilistic structure to generate
a failure probability distribution that is modified by test and flight experience in a Bayesian
statistical procedure. The probabilistic structure and statistical methodology are generally
applicable to any failure mode for which quantitative engineering analysis can be employed to
characterize the failure phenomenon and are particularly well suited for use under the con-
straints on information availability that are typical of such spaceflight systems as the Space
Shuttle and planetary spacecraft.
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Introduction
The occurrence of critical failures of such spaceflight systems as the Space Shuttle and
planetary spacecraft must be established as extremely unlikely before missions are flown.
Practices used in the aerospace community for establishing the expectation of reliable mission
operation have employed a judgmental evaluation based on limited test experience and
deterministic engineering analysis. Discussions of approaches to failure prediction used in the
Space Shuttle program are given in [1-3]. These approaches become arbitrary and are subject
to serious misinterpretation when applicable experience and information used in engineering
analysis are inadequate. Moreover, testing to establish high reliability is rarely feasible for flight
hardware. A discussion of the need for improved approaches for characterizing and managing
failure risk, including comments on the approach presented here, is given in [2]. Because of
information limitations encountered in assessing failure risk for the Space Shuttle and other
spaceflight systems, such improved approaches for managing risk must be based on methods
which enable the incorporation of information from both operating experience and engineering
analysis.
Operating experience and engineering analysis, including the analysis of past experience,
are the two fundamental information sources on which to base any assessment of the
occurrence of failures. For certain failure modes of the Space Shuttle propulsion system,
directly applicable past experience is sparse; testing sufficient to establish high reliability is
infeasible; and consistently conservative engineering analyses are not meaningful. Under these
conditions, a quantitative assessment of failure risk that incorporates all the available informa-
tion is required to make rational decisions in managing risk.
This report presents an approach for assessing failure risk that uses information from
engineering analyses and from operating experience in a statistical structure within which
uncertainties of the engineering analyses and uncertainty due to limited operating experience
are both quantitatively treated. This approach can be applied to any failure mode which can
be described by quantitative models of the physics and mechanics of the failure phenomena.
Examples of failure modes that can be quantitatively modeled include high-cycle fatigue,
low-cycle fatigue, flaw propagation, stress rupture, seal leakage, and bearing wear. This
approach is presented in more detail in [4].
A probabilistic assessment of failure risk is appropriate for certain failure modes of com-
ponents whose failure margins are of concern. That concern usually arises because the
information about the parameters that characterize a failure is limited and/or the analytical
models for the failure phenomenon are approximate. Under such circumstances, probabilistic
analyses are required to characterize meaningfully the conditions and service limits under which
failure risk is acceptable. Probabilistic analyses are required for only a subset of the failure
modes identified by means of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA). Most of the failure
modes identified by a FMEA can be shown, by means other than probabilistic analysis of the
type presented here, to be extremely unlikely.
Presently Used Approaches to Flight Readiness Assessment
The process by which the expectation of reliable mission operation is established is referred
to as certification 1 of flight readiness. More definitively, certification of a system intended for
use in a specific application is the process by which confidence is established that the system
will perform as expected over a specified range of environmental and operating conditions.
Certification of launch vehicle propulsion systems has typically consisted of a limited amount
of certification testing of flight configuration systems and deterministic engineering anaIysis.
The deterministic engineering analysis may incorporate limited information from measurements
of governing physical parameters taken during development testing.
Certification Testing
Certification testing of the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) has consisted of testing two
engines each under simulated mission conditions for twice the operating time or number of
missions for which flight readiness is being certified, a practice commonly referred to as the 2X
rule. Under this rule, certification for a five-mission increment, for example, would consist of
testing two engines each for ten missions with inspections and maintenance, including
scheduled component replacement, according to procedures prescribed for flight engines.
Certification is accomplished if the testing is completed with no failures or anomalous events.
Similar certification testing rules are found in past aircraft practice in both the commercial and
military sectors, as exemplified by the now obsolete FAR 33.14-6 [5]. Such arbitrary factor rules
for certification testing represent heuristic practices that have no formal rationale based on
statistics or engineering analysis. Under credible statistical assumptions, procedures such as
the 2_Xrule taken alone do not provide enough operating experience to establish with high
confidence that a quantitative failure probability is sufficiently low to warrant certification of flight
readiness. Test programs are structured to reveal major inadequacies in design. Testing
sufficient to establish high reliability at an acceptable confidence level is rarely performed for
launch vehicle propulsion systems.
The value of test experience in establishing low failure probability with high confidence for
flight configuration systems is limited because testing is usually halted before failures are
expected to occur. For highly reliable systems, testing sufficient to encounter failures would
be prohibitively time consuming and costly. Moreover, testing is normally planned to avoid
failures that could result in the loss of costly hardware and damage to expensive test facilities.
As a rule, failure experience is not applicable to flight hardware because failure modes
discovered during development testing are corrected by design changes which are intended
to render their occurrence highly unlikely during subsequent tests and flights. Consequently,
test experience for launch vehicle propulsion systems generally does not include failure data
for flight configuration hardware, but instead consists of zero-failure test data.
The exclusive use of zero-failure tests to establish with high confidence that failure risk is low
requires extensive test data. If each mission simulation test is assumed to be an identical
independent trial with constant probability of failure, over 690 mission simulation tests would
have to be conducted in order to have even 50 percent probability of observing a failure mode
whose probability of occurrence during a mission is 1/1000.
1Thetermqualification is alsoused.
Deterministic Engineering Analysis
Consistently and verifiably conservative deterministic analyses to predict failure can provide
assurance that the conditions under which a critical failure mode could occur do not intersect
conditions that exist during mission operation. Such analyses are appropriate for most of the
failure modes identified in a FMEA. In that situation, the deterministic approach serves to
establish that the occurrence of the failure mode in question is extremely unlikely, although no
quantitative estimate of the probability of failure is available from such analyses. When
constraints and requirements for performance, weight, and cost force a departure from
consistently conservative deterministic analyses for certain failure modes, worst-case or limiting
values for parameters that govern failure are not always employed.
When worst-case values for the parameters that govern failure cannot be consistently used,
deterministic analysis methods are credible if they are calibrated by means of past experience
that is directly relevant in terms of knowledge of governing parameters, the stochastic nature
of materials behavior, the accuracy of engineering models under the conditions of application,
and the variability of manufacturing processes. Where there exists an extensive, directly
relevant base of experience to guide the selection of less conservative safety factors and values
for governing parameters, deterministic analyses provide failure predictions that are generally
consistent with the experience base, although the extent of conservatism is not known.
Launch vehicle propulsion systems are typically subject to some significant number of failure
modes for which important governing parameters may not be well known (e.g., knowledge of
structural loads or a local environment may be highly uncertain) and the accuracy of engineering
models used to characterize the failure phenomena may be in question. For certain failure
modes of such systems as the SSME, where performance, weight, and cost requirements force
the use of new design approaches, advanced materials, and more severe operating conditions,
no suitably extensive experience base is available to calibrate deterministic analyses to
characterize and predict failure.
Deterministic analyses under conditions of limited information and uncertain knowledge
become arbitrary and can yield results that are subject to serious misinterpretation [1]. In these
situations, a formal procedure for quantitatively accounting for risk due to limited information
and uncertain knowledge is required if consistent criteria for flight readiness are to be
established. In these cases, the consideration of risk by means of qualitative judgments based
on deterministic analyses of failure modes and limited test experience is inadequate.
Failure Risk Assessment
At any time in the development and operation of a launch vehicle propulsion system, the
available information on which to base an assessment of failure risk or flight readiness comes
from two fundamental sources: engineering analysis and operating experience. Figure 1 shows
how these two information sources are used in quantitatively assessing failure risk in a Bayesian
statistical framework. The Bayesian statistical framework used here is a straightforward
approach for combining information from engineering analysis with observed operating ex-
perience and can be applied individually to certain failure modes identified in a FMEA.
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Figure 1. Information Sources for Failure Risk Assessment
Engineering analyses characterize the conditions under which specific failure modes may be
expected to occur, e.g., pressure or accumulated time in service. As illustrated in Fig. 1,
engineering analysis provides information to establish the prior failure risk estimate, called a
prior distribution, which is modified to reflect available success/failure data in the Bayesian
statistical analysis [6]. Engineering analysis to predict failure is based on available knowledge
of governing physical parameters, e.g., loads and materials properties, that can be derived
from measurements taken during operation, from past experience and analyses performed to
characterize parameter values, from subsystem and component testing, and/or from laboratory
tests.
As shown in Fig. 1, operating experience consists of parameter information and suc-
cess/failure data. Success/failure data can be acquired from development testing, certification
testing, and, possibly, flight operation. When the success/failure data for flight configuration
hardware consists of a limited amount of experience with no failures, as is generally the case
for launch vehicle propulsion systems including those of the Space Shuttle, the data is a weak
information source for failure risk assessment. However, measurements of physical parameters
used in engineering analysis, such as temperatures and loads, can be a strong information
source in failure risk estimation.
The failure risk estimate resulting from the combination of the prior risk estimate and the
success/failure data is that which is warranted by the available information. As additional
information regarding governing physical parameters becomes available, it can be incorporated
into the engineering analysis to obtain revised prior failure risk estimates. Additional information
in the form of success/failure data can be processed by the Bayesian statistical algorithm to
update the failure risk estimate.
If the available success/failure data is a weak information source, the failure risk estimate will
be predominantly determined by the prior failure risk estimate of Fig. 1. In such cases, the prior
distributions must correctly represent the states of knowledge regarding risk of occurrence of
the failure modes characterized by engineering analyses. It has been found in several case
studies of SSME failure modes that incomplete knowledge of certain governing parameters in
the engineering analyses is a major source of uncertainty in assessing the risk of occurrence
of specific failure modes [7-12].
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Probabilistic Failure Assessment
Approach and Structure
A formal stochastic structure for quantitatively assessing failure risk based on the available
information about certain failure modes identified in a FMEA is shown in Fig. 2. Such a failure
risk evaluation that considers failure modes meeting criteria discussed above is the foundation
for assessing flight readiness. This stochastic structure is called the Probabilistic Failure
Assessment (PFA) methodology and is an implementation of the Bayesian statistical framework
described above in which information from engineering analysis is combined with suc-
cess/failure data to obtain a quantitative failure risk estimate and a measure of its uncertainty
[4]. The available information pertinent to characterizing specific failure modes is used in the
PFA methodology not only to estimate the failure probability appropriate to the states of
knowledge about failure modes, but also to characterize the sensitivity of failure probability to
increased knowledge of such parameters as structural loads, operating environment, and
materials behavior.
The elements presented in Fig. 2 are essential to evaluate failure risk rationally. These
essential elements are: (1) the joint inclusion of information generated by engineering analysis
and operating experience, (2) quantitative modeling of the physics and mechanics of the failure
phenomenon, (3) representation of the uncertainty in the engineering analysis parameters and
models, including uncertainty due to both intrinsic variation and lack of knowledge, and (4)
consideration of multiple mission usage of flight systems.
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Figure 2. The Probabilistic Failure Assessment Methodology
The PFA methodology consists of three major steps: probabilistic failure modeling, a
Bayesian statistical analysis to consider the available success/failure data, and a mission
analysis in which the failure estimates for a number of relevant failure modes are aggregated
to obtain a system failure risk estimate for the service life. Probabilistic failure modeling and
the Bayesian statistical analysis are performed for each failure mode identified for analysis.
The PFA methodology employs the quantitative models used in engineering analyses of
failure modes in a probabilistic structure within which uncertainties due to limited information
regarding values for analysis parameters and the accuracy of the models employed are
quantitatively treated. The stochastic structure and statistical approach are generally applicable
to failure modes of spaceflight systems. The PFA methodology may be applied to any failure
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mode for which quantitative engineering analysis can be employed to characterize the failure
phenomenon.
Probabilistic Failure Modeling
The probabilistic failure modeling step of the PFA methodology is shown in greater detail in
Fig. 3. In this step, uncertainties in engineering analysis parameters and models for the failure
mode being analyzed are used in conjunction with the quantitative model of the failure
phenomenon to simulate failures. The failure models are directly derived from the engineering
analyses of the failure mode and express a failure parameter, such as burst pressure or fatigue
life, as a function of drivers. The drivers include dimensions, loads, materials characteristics,
modeling accuracy, and environmental parameters such as local temperatures.
For many important failure modes, the failure model of Fig. 3 is complex and involves the
use of several engineering analysis procedures. The accuracy of each engineering model and
procedure is probabilistically characterized and also treated as a driver in the PFA methodology.
A typical stochastic materials characterization model is discussed in [9]. In that model both
the intrinsic variability of materials behavior and the uncertainty resulting from basing a model
of that behavior on limited information are treated.
State-of-the-art engineering models of failure modes used by the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) and the launch vehicle propulsion system manufacturers incor-
porate procedures that have evolved through extensive experience. These deterministic
models are comprised of a series of steps, each of which may be complex. The PFA
methodology has been developed to accommodate generally accepted engineering models in
current use. Assessments of model accuracy are based on an organization's experience with
these engineering models and on specific calibrations of the models.
PRO(_BlUSTIC CHARACTERIZATIONS
OF DRNER UNCERTAJNTY
DIMENSION
MODELING ACCURACY
7°.
Figure 3. The Probabilistic Failure Modeling Procedure
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By calculating failure risk from an analysis based on the specification of failure models and
drivers, the PFA methodology permits the quantitative assessment of failure risk when the failure
data necessary to characterize component reliability does not exist.
Driver Characterization
In the PFA methodology, a driver for which uncertainty is to be considered is characterized
by a probability distribution over the range of values it can assume. That distribution expresses
uncertainty regarding specific driver values within the range of possible values. A driver
probability distribution must represent both intrinsic variability of the driver and uncertainty due
to limited information on which to base the driver characterization. There is no restriction on
specifying explicit driver probability distributions or defining processes which generate implicit
driver probability distributions.
Stochastic drivers are characterized by using the information that exists at the time of analysis.
If driver information is sparse, then the probabilistic characterization of such a driver must reflect
that sparseness. If extensive experimental measurements have been performed for a driver,
its nominal value and characterization of its variability can be inferred directly from empirical
data. However, if little or no directly applicable empirical data is available for a driver,
engineering analysis and past experience with similar or related systems must be used instead.
The information on which driver characterization is based can include measurements, related
past experience, and engineering analysis conducted to bound or characterize the driver. All
sources of driver uncertainty must be considered to appropriately represent risk due to limited
information, and driver distributions must meet the criterion of not overstating the available
information. Drivers are fundamental in the sense that they are observable parameters for which
additional information regarding their values can be obtained if necessary. Such parameters
include temperatures, loads, materials behavior, and calibrations of model accuracy. If
uncertainty due to lack of information on a driver is found to make a significant contribution to
failure risk, then additional driver information should be acquired.
Computational Methods
The complexity of failure models and the need for a computational procedure capable of
accuracy have led to the use of Monte Carlo simulation as the principal computational method
in the probabilistic failure modeling step of Fig. 2. Monte Carlo simulation is a general method
for probabilistic analysis that can be used with failure models of any complexity. Continually
increasing computer power due to improving hardware and software is steadily expanding the
practical application of such computationally intensive methods as Monte Carlo simulation.
Efficient Monte Carlo techniques are available to reduce the number of simulation trials for those
problems where computational time would be an issue if direct Monte Carlo simulation were
used.
Alternatives to Monte Carlo methods may fail to give demonstrably accurate results for
realistic problems in which complex failure models are employed. Alternative computational
methods can be used in probabilistic analyses which employ well-behaved failure models,
particularly if the failure criterion is expressed explicitly in a closed form equation as opposed
to a complex multistep algorithm.
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Certain engineering analysis procedures sometimes employed in failure models, such as
finite-element structural models, may appear to be too computationally intensive for practical
use in a Monte Carlo simulation. However, when such procedures are used in a failure model
for PFA, they can be represented as response surfaces over the range of variation of significant
parameters. Alternative computational techniques may be useful in conducting engineering
analyses to generate such response surfaces. The uncertainties of engineering analysis
procedures and of the response surface representation must be treated as drivers if significant.
Application of Probabilistic Failure Assessment
In assessing flight readiness, sound judgment is required to identify critical failure modes, to
understand their origins and mechanisms, and to guide the implementation of the probabilistic
analysis. The failure models required for meaningful probabilistic analysis must be developed
in concert with a valid interpretation of relevant experience. Adjudging failure probabilities, even
with the most sophisticated methods, does not imply that the origins, mechanisms, and
consequences of known failure modes are understood and have been properly treated nor that
unexpected test observations and indications of unanticipated failure modes have been
pursued until they are understood and accounted for. An understanding of the causes and
mechanisms by which failures occur is the foundation on which valid failure models must be
based.
The necessity for conducting an appropriate amount of testing for launch vehicle propulsion
systems is not eliminated through the use of the PFA methodology to assess risk of failure.
Testing programs and careful analysis of flight experience are essential because they can
uncover failure modes not analyzed, analysis oversights or errors, and anomalous conditions.
Application of the PFA methodology to a subset of failure modes selected by a FMEA and
other screening procedures will identify those failure modes whose risk of occurrence is
unacceptable. Options for corrective action that could be taken to reduce risk are shown in Fig.
4. Since the PFA methodology produces a risk assessment that is commensurate with the
available information, an unacceptable risk could be reduced by acquiring additional informa-
RISK ESTIMATION
ACCEPTABLE RISK UNACCEPTABLE RISK
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Figure 4. Options for Reducing Failure Risk
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tion to reduce the uncertainty of dominant drivers or by changing the design so that the available
information is sufficient.
By conducting sensitivity analyses for selected failure modes with the PFA methodology, the
sources of unacceptable failure risk can be identified in terms of the responsible drivers, and
corrective action can be delineated. Improvements in manufacturing processes, additional
characterization of loads and environments, validation of analytical models, improved charac-
terization of materials behavior, design changes, and additional testing are among the options
for corrective act/on that can be quantitatively evaluated by PFA sensitivity analyses. The PFA
methodology can be employed to identify risk sources and corrective actions during the design,
development, and operational phases of a program.
Risk assessments for critical failure modes of SSME components both in use and in
development have been conducted by means of the PFA methodology and are documented
in [7-12]. These case studies demonstrate the techniques of the PFA methodology and
illustrate its use to quantify failure risk and to identify the dominant drivers that contribute to
risk.
Conclusions
The PFA methodology is a structured, probabilistic approach for quantitatively assessing the
risk of occurrence of critical failure modes identified by a FMEA and other screening procedures.
Whenever flight readiness must be assured under conditions of limited information and
uncertain knowledge that are typical of launch vehicle propulsion systems, including those of
the Space Shuttle, no other rational approach for quantitatively assessing and managing failure
risk is available. The PFA methodology provides the capability to quantitatively evaluate and
rank options to improve reliability, thereby enabling limited financial resources for development
and improvement programs to be more effectively allocated. In particular, the PFA methodol-
ogy provides a means for basing the certification of flight readiness on a quantitative assess-
ment of failure risk.
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